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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the 1960s the dominant international financial issue related to the adequacy 
of international reserves
1. Plans to reform the Bretton Woods system focused on 
creating additional liquidity and culminated in the introduction of Special Drawing 
Rights (SDRs) in 1970
2. The concern then was that inadequate global liquidity would 
eventually drive the world economy into recession and would prevent countries from 
effectively protecting the values of their currencies, as the Bretton Woods system 
required them to do. In this regard, reserve inadequacy could affect individual 
countries differently. Some countries opted to hold more reserves than others and it 
seemed only natural to ask at what point reserves became inadequate; or indeed 
excessive. 
A literature rapidly built up around the issue of reserve adequacy and the 
related demand for international reserves. Indeed, this literature had become 
sufficiently large and important to warrant a survey article in the Economic Journal 
(Williamson, 1973). However, there was a certain irony in the timing of this survey; 
just as it appeared, the issue upon which it focused seemed to fade in significance. 
The adoption of generalised flexible exchange rates in 1973 implied that balance of 
payments disequilibria would lead to changes in the relative values of currencies 
rather than changes in the level of reserves. Moreover, the growth of international 
capital markets suggested that many countries could augment their reserves by 
international borrowing. 
                                                 
1 This is reflected in a survey of plans for reforming the international monetary system 
produced at the time which deals almost entirely with schemes designed to increase 
international liquidity (Machlup, 1964) 
 
2 Bird (1998) provides a brief analysis of the economics as well as the politics which lay 
behind the decision to introduce SDRs. The IMF envisaged that the SDR would become the 
principal reserve asset in the international monetary system, but as things turned out, it has 
played nothing more than a marginal role.   3
Other developments also seemed to sideline concerns about the composition of 
international reserves that had been another feature of the 1960s (Dooley, Lizondo 
and Mathieson 1989)
3. The Triffin dilemma (Triffin, 1970) had highlighted an 
internal inconsistency associated with using the US dollar as the world’s principal 
international reserve asset since, in effect, it was being required to be simultaneously 
a “weak” and a “strong” currency. Weak in the sense that the US needed to create 
externally held dollar liabilities in order to add to international liquidity, and strong in 
the sense that there was a need to maintain confidence in it. The move towards a 
multiple currency system alongside the reduced need for the growth of international 
reserves as a consequence of the move to flexible exchange rates and the growth of 
private international capital markets helped circumvent the Triffin dilemma. 
Yet even as the question of reserve adequacy disappeared from the agenda for 
international monetary reform, it remained a prominent issue for many developing 
countries. Many of these countries lacked easy access to international capital markets 
from which they could supplement their reserves. Furthermore they were reluctant to 
abandon currency pegging. This meant that they were vulnerable to the “third 
currency phenomenon” where the value of their currencies changed in step with the 
value of the currency to which they pegged. Inappropriate changes in the value of 
their currency relative to third currencies, driven by changes in the value of the anchor 
currency, could then exacerbate their balance of payments problems. Some analysts 
therefore suggested that the move to generalised flexible exchange rates among 
developed countries served to increase the need for reserves in developing countries. 
Indeed, developing countries themselves pushed for changes in the way in which 
                                                 
3 The composition of reserves was found to be dependent on the type of exchange rate regime, 
the composition of foreign debt, as well as the dominant trade partners. 
   4
SDRs were distributed that would favour them
4. However, different exchange rates 
practices across developing countries as well as differences in access to private capital 
meant that it was illegitimate to treat them as a single group. Studies generally 
confirmed that reserve adequacy could be expected to vary amongst developing 
countries depending on their economic circumstances (Bird, 1978, Flanders, 1971, 
Heller and Khan, 1978, Iyoha, 1976, Kafka, 1968, Kenen and Yudin, 1965, Niehans, 
1970, and Officer, 1976). 
The issue of reserve adequacy surfaced again as an issue of more general 
interest during the 1990s and early 2000 as a series of currency crises hit emerging 
economies such as Mexico, Thailand, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Russia, Brazil and 
Argentina. Rapid reserve depletion became a defining feature of currency crises, and 
reserve levels ex ante showed up as a significant variable in studies examining the 
predictability of crises (Bussiere and Mulder, 1999, ul Haque, Kumar and Mathieson, 
1996 and Disyatat, 2001). Events in the 1990s and beyond also illustrated the 
deficiencies of earlier approaches to judging the adequacy of reserves. These earlier 
approaches had frequently been based on a benchmark ratio of reserves-to-imports 
(R/M) which was derived from a trade-related approach to the balance of payments 
and reserve needs. Crises in the 1990s were more to do with the capital account; 
measures of reserve adequacy based on the current account were therefore largely 
inappropriate. Certainly the R/M ratio had not provided any clear indication of the 
                                                 
4 Williamson (1976) offers an attempt to quantify the effect of generalised floating on the 
reserve needs of developing countries. The issue is also discussed at some length in Bird 
(1978) who also provides an assessment of the proposal for an SDR-aid link. Heller and Khan 
(1978) also find that the demand for reserves in developing countries seemed to increase 
following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. Lizondo and Mathieson (1987) report a 
similar structural break following the debt crisis in the early 1980s, with the demand for 
reserves in developing countries becoming more sensitive to payments imbalances and 
openness, suggesting that this reflected reduced capital market access.   5
probability of crisis. Dissatisfaction with this measure has motivated the pursuit of a 
superior but operationally expedient alternative. 
Fischer (2001) nicely summarises the importance of reserves in the era of 
capital mobility as follows. 
Reserves matter because they are a key determinant of a country's 
ability to avoid economic and financial crisis. This is true of all 
countries, but especially of emerging markets open to volatile 
international capital flows…The availability of capital flows to offset 
current account shocks should, on the face of it, reduce the amount of 
reserves a country needs. But access to private capital is often 
uncertain, and inflows are subject to rapid reversals, as we have seen 
all too often in recent years. We have also seen in the recent crises that 
countries that had big reserves by and large did better in withstanding 
contagion than those with smaller reserves.. (pp.1-3) (also see De 
Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn, 2001). 
 
This paper has a number of purposes. First, it revisits the older theory of 
reserve adequacy and optimality to see whether this can still be used and perhaps 
strengthened in ways that would inform the current debate. Second, it explores the 
connection between reserve adequacy and currency crisis in the light of recent 
experience and empirical research. Third, it critically investigates alternative rule-of-
thumb measures of reserve adequacy. Fourth, and drawing on the foregoing analysis, 
it examines the extent to which crisis countries should seek to replenish and build up 
their international reserves in the post crisis period. Additional owned reserves 
represent a guaranteed and unconditional source of liquidity; is this what is needed?  
 
2.    JUDGING RESERVE ADEQUACY: THEORETICAL AND 
OPERATIONAL APPROACHES 
a  The Historical Context 
  International reserves are, in essence, an inventory held against the uncertain 
future course of the balance of payments. Where balance of payments instability   6
emanates from the current account, there may appear to be some logic in judging the 
adequacy of reserves against the size of trade flows as proxied by the value of 
imports. For this reason, as well as for reasons of operational simplicity, the reserves-
to-imports (R/M) ratio became the standard way of quantifying reserve adequacy. In 
other words, imports were thought to be the most appropriate scale variable. In its 
World Economic Outlook the IMF has regularly presented data about reserve levels in 
this way. Indirectly the R/M ratio measures the number of months of imports that can 
be financed by reserves. A rule-of-thumb emerged that reserves were inadequate if 
they covered less than about three to four month’s worth of imports (Fischer, 2001). 
However, theoretical justification for this approach was never strong; the central 
problem was one of defining the optimum value of the R/M ratio. Moreover, unless 
the incidence of deficits grows in a linear relationship with the value of imports, it 
cannot be assumed that any specific value of the ratio will remain appropriate over 
time as trade grows. Although attempts have been made to bring greater theoretical 
sophistication to the R/M approach, by, for example, allowing for trend movements 
and stock adjustments (Frenkel and Jovanovic, 1981), it has remained at best little 
more that an exercise in approximation. 
  A theoretically stronger optimising approach fared little better because of its 
operational shortcomings.
  This approach was derived from theoretically adjacent 
analysis of the demand for reserves which viewed demand as being a positive 
function of the benefits conferred by reserves, in the form of consumption smoothing, 
and a negative function of the opportunity cost of holding them
5.
  The demand 
therefore reflected the choice made by the relevant monetary authorities concerning 
                                                 
5 De Beaufort Wijnholds (1977) provided a contemporary and comprehensive survey of the 
demand for reserves and related methods of evaluating the adequacy of reserves. A briefer 
review of the principal issues may be found in Bird (1985).   7
the combination of balance of payments financing and adjustment in the event of a 
balance of payments deficit, and, in relation to this, their preferences as between the 
level and stability of national income
6.  The demand for reserves was expected to rise 
alongside the probability of balance of payments deficits and the perceived costs of 
adjustment. Similarly, in as much as reserves represent a precautionary balance or 
insurance, it might be assumed that the income elasticity of demand for reserves 
would exceed one, unless, of course, there are economies of scale
7. The standard 
reference with regard to optimal international reserves for this period was Heller 
(1966) who examined not only the underlying theory but also provided an attempt at 
empirical estimation. He found that in the early 1960s developing countries as a group 
held sub-optimal reserves; but this was not the case for all of them
8.  
At the same time, in what became known as the “Mrs Machlup’s Wardrobe 
Theory”, Machlup (1966) suggested that the acquisitive characteristics of monetary 
authorities in terms of adding to their reserves resembled those of his wife in terms of 
clothes. According to this idea no level of reserves was ever enough. Bird (1978) 
summarises Machlup’s argument as follows.  
Perhaps the most devastating attack on the use of any ratios in the 
analysis of the demand for reserves has been undertaken by Machlup 
                                                 
 
6 A clear exposition of optimal reserves, which approached the subject in this way was 
provided by Clark (1970). Bird (1978) revisits the approach and applies it in the context of 
developing countries. 
 
7 Theory is somewhat unclear on this issue. To some extent reserves are a precautionary 
balance and may be regarded as a luxury good, which therefore only better off countries 
might  be  expected  to  be  able  to    afford. At the same time analogies with the transactions 
demand for money along Baumolian lines (Baumol,1952) might imply that the “square-root 
rule” could apply. This argument is developed in Heller (1968). 
 
8 The range is illustrated by the following examples which report the ratio of actual to optimal 
reserves. Argentina, 0.29, Brazil, 0.56, Chile, 0.55, Colombia, 0.40, Jamaica, 2.28, Mexico, 
0.98 Peru, 1.65, Venezuela, 0.64, India, 0.48, Indonesia, 0.19, Korea, 0.92, Malaysia, 3.95, 
Pakistan, 0.70, Philippines, 0.56, Thailand, 2.26. 
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(1966). He argues that at both a theoretical and empirical level there is 
little or no evidence to support the existence of a straightforward 
relationship between reserves and any other suggested explanatory 
variable…(H)e concludes, basically, that year upon year monetary 
authorities wish to see their reserves grow in size. The demand for 
reserves in any period is then simply a function of the level of reserves 
in the previous period. The level of reserves demanded in period  t+1 is 
merely equal to the level of reserves in period t, plus a growth factor 
(p.100). 
 
The general difficulty, however, was more in finding suitable proxies for the 
theoretical determinants of optimal reserves. To what extent could the ex ante 
probability of future balance of payments deficits be captured by their ex post 
incidence, or is balance of payments instability purely random?  To what extent could 
the costs of adjustment be estimated by using the average propensity to import? And 
how could the social return on resources be captured in order to help calculate the 
opportunity cost of holding reserves? 
 
b  Limitations of the Historical Approach to Judging Reserve Adequacy 
There were further problems with the optimising approach since in theory 
optimal reserves depended on the nature of the exchange rate regime and access to 
international capital. In principle, it seemed reasonable to assume that exchange rate 
flexibility and international borrowing were substitutes for holding reserves; but to 
what extent? Moreover, as noted, even in principle it was unclear whether flexible 
exchange rates would necessarily reduce the demand for reserves since currency 
misalignment had been shown to be feasible under a flexible rate regime, and access 
to international capital markets depends on creditworthiness which may itself change 
in positive association with the level of reserves (ul Haque, Kumar and Mathiesen, 
1996).   9
While researchers made valiant efforts to deal with these theoretical and 
operational difficulties, their results bore testimony to the significance of the 
assumptions made; results were sensitive to alterations in the assumptions. The 
operational simplicity of the R/M ratio triumphed over the theoretical sophistication 
of the optimising approach. However, recent global developments have glaringly 
revealed the shortcomings of the R/M ratio. It is time to rethink the issue of reserve 
adequacy. 
Two questions immediately arise. First, is it possible to resurrect and 
operationalise the optimising approach? The short answer is “not easily”. The 
theoretical determinants of optimal reserves cannot be estimated with sufficient 
precision and accuracy to allow calculations of reserve optimality to be regarded with 
confidence. Thus any estimates of optimum reserves need to be accompanied by a 
sensitivity analysis which almost certainly makes fairly meaningless the attempt to be 
precise. These difficulties were again illustrated during debates towards the end of 
1990s about whether there was a global need for an additional allocation of SDRs. 
The theory simply did not allow a definitive judgement to be made about the 
adequacy of international reserves (Mussa, 1996). 
The second question is whether there is a better “rule of thumb” than can be 
used to replace or augment the reserves-to-imports ratio. The literature discussing the 
R/M ratio had, even in the 1960s, contemplated relating reserves to the domestic 
money supply or liquid liabilities held by foreigners or a country’s net external 
balance (see, for example, Johnson, 1958, Scitovsky, 1958, Lamfalussy, 1968, IMF, 
1970). Although these ratios suffer from many of the same drawbacks as the R/M 
ratio, they at least reorientate attention away from the current account as the source of 
balance of payments instability.    10
As noted, crises of the 1990s and beyond that have afflicted many middle-
income developing countries have predominantly been crises of the capital account. 
Reserve adequacy benchmarks accordingly need to be modified to allow for capital 
outflows as well as for imports to be a potential drain on reserves (Bird and Rajan, 
2002, Fischer, 2001 and Rajan, 2002b). The weight attached to the current account or 
the capital account as potential sources of balance of payments instability may, of 
course, be expected to vary across developing and emerging economies. For some 
poorer economies which have not attracted private capital and have a highly 
concentrated export base the R/M ratio may remain the more useful indicator of 
reserve adequacy. For other richer and more diversified economies which have 
experienced inflows of private capital, a measure of reserve adequacy that 
acknowledges their vulnerability to sudden capital outflows (or reduced capital 
inflows) rather than sudden export shortfalls may be more useful. 
The next section attempts to move from the general to the specific by offering 
some alternative measures or reserve adequacy. There are two conceptual weaknesses 
associated with reserve adequacy that need to be noted and underlined at this stage. 
First, and as implied earlier, the adequacy of reserves can only be legitimately viewed 
in the context of a package of policies. Reserve decumulation is but one way of 
responding to a current account balance of payments deficit. There are alternative 
options in terms of both external financing and economic adjustment. Thus, a specific 
level of reserves may be inadequate in the context of a situation where there are no 
alternative sources of financing and a reluctance or inability to correct a current 
account deficit, but at the same time adequate when alternative sources of financing 
exist or adjustment can be quickly attained. It follows that it is of limited value to 
examine the adequacy of reserves in “partial” terms and in isolation. In this sense, any   11
ratio approach to judging reserve adequacy will give a misleading impression of 
simplicity (we take this issue up again in section 4). 
Second, and in the context of currency crises, there is an element of truth in 
the idea that any level of reserves that international capital markets, and nationals who 
are in a position to engage in capital flight, perceive as being inadequate will turn out 
to be inadequate. Once investors lose confidence in a currency and the government is 
unable to restore it, reserves will tend to rapidly dissipate. The rate of depletion is 
then likely to increase as the level of reserves declines, since falling reserve levels 
will further erode confidence. Panic sets in and this infects other investors who would 
otherwise not have thought to withdraw their capital. There is an element of self-
fulfillment here as the perception that reserves are inadequate leads to behaviour that 
then makes them inadequate. Where reserves are no longer adequate to cover short-
term external liabilities, the loss of confidence may become total.  
The problem, of course, is that while it is easy to say that the adequacy of 
reserves depends on investor confidence, it is difficult to say with precision what 
determines this. Again, it will almost certainly be influenced by the package of 
economic policies that a government is pursuing and the commitment with which they 
are being pursued, as well as by economic performance, but it is also likely to be 
affected by the perceived degree of political stability and indeed by the level of 
reserves itself (Bird and Rajan, 2001, 2002). In these circumstances rule-of-thumb 
indicators of reserve adequacy, for all their shortcomings, may be the best that can be 
achieved. They may remain helpful provided they are interpreted as merely indicative 
rather than definitive. Mistakes in judgement may still be made where ex ante 
assumptions are not matched by ex post reality.  Thus it was that prior to crises both 
the Mexican and the Thai authorities built up their international reserves to levels that   12
exceeded conventional indicators of adequacy (see section 4). The fact that, as events 
turned out, these levels were insufficient to prevent the currency crises that occurred 
in part reflects the deficiencies of these conventional measures but also reflects the 
problems in anticipating and forecasting investor behaviour. 
 
3.  INDICATORS OF RESERVE ADEQUACY: WHAT DO THEY SHOW? 
The analysis in the previous section shows that definitive measures of reserve 
adequacy may be beyond our reach because of the theoretical complexities involved. 
The information needed to construct these measures is simply unavailable. At the 
same time, global experience has suggested that reserve levels may be a significant 
factor in helping to explain and predict currency crises (Fischer, 2001). It is therefore 
unwise to regard reserve levels as altogether irrelevant. Conventional indicators of 
reserve adequacy based on instability in the current account of the balance of 
payments may remain useful for some countries where trade-related shocks remain 
the principal source of payments vulnerability. However, for other countries that have 
a large stock of short-term external debt, the ratio of reserves to imports is unlikely to 
capture their ability to finance payments shocks. This suggests that the reserves-to-
imports ratio needs to be supplemented by other rules-of-thumb. But what form would 
these alternatives take? 
 
a  Importance of Short-term External Debt 
In the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, the extent of short-term indebtedness 
has been found to be a key indicator of illiquidity and a robust predictor of financial 
crises (Bussiére and Mulder, 1999, Dadush, Dasgupta and Ratha, 2000, Rodrik and 
Velasco, 1999 and World Bank, 2000). According to Dadush et al., and on the basis   13
of data for 33 developing economies, the elasticity of short-term debt with respect to 
GDP growth is 0.9 when there is a positive shock and -1.8 when there is a negative 
shock. The extreme reversibility of short-term debt in the event of negative shock 
exposes borrowers to liquidity runs and systemic crises
9. In view of the importance of 
short-term external debt, proposals have been made to resurrect the idea of expressing 
a country’s reserves in relation to its short-term external debt (STED).  
The reserves-to-short-term external debt (R/STED) ratio may provide a useful 
indicator of the threshold at which investors lose confidence. It may therefore connect 
with the theory of currency crises. Pablo Guidotti, former Deputy Minister of Finance 
of Argentina, is credited with being the first to propose that countries should manage 
their external assets and liabilities in such a way as to be capable of living without 
foreign borrowing for up to one year (De Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn, 2001). 
This implies, at a minimum, that usable foreign exchange reserves should exceed 
scheduled external amortisation for one year. However, this “external balance sheet 
rule” measure implies that there is a discreet distinction between reserve adequacy 
and reserve inadequacy. It may therefore be insufficiently subtle. Other criticisms 
have been made of the R/STED ratio, suggesting that, while it gives an indication of 
the vulnerability to an “external drain”, it fails to capture the threat of an “internal 
drain” associated with capital flight by residents (De Beaufort Wijnholds and 
Kapteyn, 2001). The latter may be best captured by measures of broad money supply 
(M2)
10.  
Perhaps of more significance, is that the R/STED ratio fails to reflect the 
                                                 
9 In a somewhat contrarian view, Jeanne (2000) argues that it is not clear that short-term debt 
contracts ought to be discouraged as they may play a socially advantageous function in 
reducing agency problems. The World Bank (1999) surveys recent literature on short-term 
debt and financial crises. 
10 A low and declining reserves-to-M2 ratio, which captures the extent to which liabilities of 
the banking system are backed by international reserves, is among the leading indicators of a   14
dynamics of currency crises. In addition to monitoring the level of reserves in relation 
to proxies for either current account or capital account vulnerability, an attempt 
should also be made to monitor the change in reserves as well as its rate of change. 
How rapidly are reserves falling and how quickly will threshold ratios be reached? A 
country with stable reserves close to the “threshold” or “minimum” ratios may have 
fewer problems than a second country which, although having higher contemporary 
ratios, appears more likely to dip below the threshold ratios if current trends continue. 
The need for policy change could therefore be signalled by a country falling below a 
predefined set of ratio values or by a rate of reserve depletion suggesting that these 
values will rapidly be approached. But how rapidly? Since rapid reserve loss signals 
the need for a change in policy, the indicator needs to be designed in a way that 
allows sufficient time for the policy changes to be implemented and to take effect.  
Again precision appears beyond current scientific capabilities and some 
degree of subjective judgement is therefore unavoidable. There are also different rates 
of response to policies designed to strengthen the current as compared with the capital 
account. Thus, currency devaluation may take some months before its impact is felt 
on export earnings, since export supply elasticity may be little different from zero in 
the near term. On the other hand, and in combination with supportive macroeconomic 
and structural polices, it may have a much more rapid or even quasi-immediate impact 
on the capital account by restoring confidence and by changing expectations
11. Given 
that currency crises tend to be associated with the capital account, it may be 
reasonable to allow for a modest cushion over and above short-term external debt. 
                                                                                                                                            
currency crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). See the notes in Table 2. 
 
11 Another difficulty in this context is that in some circumstances devaluation may have an 
adverse effect on confidence and may therefore weaken the capital account even further (Bird 
and Rajan, 2001 and Rajan and Shen, 2001).   15
The cushion might be required to vary with the maturity structure of the debt. For 
illustrative purposes assume that a country holds $X billion of short-term debt that 
falls due evenly throughout the next 290 working days. Assume further that the 
implementation of an effective policy change takes 10 days, then an additional 
cushion of approximately 3 percent of short-term debt may be warranted
12. However, 
the principal purpose of monitoring the dynamics of reserve depletion is not to 
estimate the exact adequacy of reserves but rather to signal the need for policy change 
in advance of reaching a minimum threshold that may herald the arrival of a full 
blown crisis as captured by conventional currency crisis models. 
It is also in this spirit that Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve 
Board of the United States, offered two enhancements to the “Guidotti-rule”   
(Greenspan, 1999). The first of these would be to have an additional rule that the 
average maturity of a country’s external liabilities should exceed a certain threshold, 
such as three years. The second enhancement is to have a  “liquidity-at-risk” standard. 
Under this standard, a country’s external liability position would be calculated over a 
wide range of possible outcomes, taking into account the full set of external assets and 
liabilities. An appropriate level of reserves would then be the one that provides a high 
probability that external liquidity will be sufficient to avoid new borrowing for one 
year (say 95 per cent). This methodology is broadly similar to the value-at-risk 
methodology used by commercial banks’ (De Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn, 
2001). 
 
                                                 
 
12 Thus, while countries would monitor changes in reserves and the rate at which reserves are 
changing in an on-going way, they would hold a cushion of reserves above the minimum 
level implied by the Guidotti-rule to allow for a policy response to reserve depletion before 
the minimum level was reached.   16
b  What Do the Data Tell Us? 
Table 1 presents data on two alternative measures of reserve adequacy for 
emerging economies at the end of the 1990s. The table distinguishes between those 
countries identified by the IMF as having independent floating or a managed 
float/pegged exchange rate
13. A number of observations may be made about the data. 
First, and on average, R/M ratios are not discernibly different between those countries 
with independent floating and managed floating or exchange rate pegging. Second, 
there are wide differences within each category. Amongst the independent floaters 
(“floating with a life jacket”) there is a range from 11 weeks of imports in the case of 
Mexico to 46 weeks in the case of Peru. Data relating to reserves-to-imports ratios 
would not have accurately predicted future difficulties in Brazil, Turkey and 
Argentina in the post 1999 period. Data on the reserves-to-short-term external debt 
ratio also reveal wide dispersion. However, in general, countries with managed 
exchange rates hold a higher ratio of reserves to short term external debt. Third, there 
is no close correlation between the alternative measures of adequacy. While Mexico 
failed the three months of imports threshold of reserve adequacy, it passed the short-
term external debt (STED) threshold by having sufficient reserves to cover short-term 
debt. Meanwhile Brazil, South Africa, Turkey and Argentina failed the STED 
threshold, but passed - albeit only just in the case of South Africa - the R/M threshold. 
Only Russia failed in terms of both criteria. 
Table 2 presents two further calculations of reserve adequacy for emerging 
economies. One is based on a measure advocated by De Beaufort Wijnholds and 
Kapteyn (2001) which incorporates both short-term external debt and a measure of the 
scope for capital flight (part of M2) modified by a “probability factor” captured by a 
                                                 
13 This distinction is notoriously imprecise (see De Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn, 2001).    17
country risk index. Their measure is more fully explained in the notes to the table. 
The second measure is based on incorporating an additional cushion over and above 
short-term external debt to provide a time period for policy change before the 
R/STED threshold is reached as discussed in the previous subsection. There is broad 
agreement across the two indicators concerning reserve adequacy except in the cases 
of Colombia, Indonesia and Mexico where the De Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn 
(2001) measure implies reserve inadequacy and the augmented short-term external 
debt measure does not. However, in none of these cases are the differences 
quantitatively large. Both approaches suggest that Brazil, Russia, South Africa, 
Turkey and Argentina were holding inadequate reserves in 1999.  
The Table reveals something else as well. It suggests that while, from amongst 
the Asian economies, Hong Kong, Indonesia, and the Philippines were holding 
broadly “adequate” reserves by end 1999, Korea, Thailand and Malaysia had actual 
reserves significantly in excess of adequate levels. Substantial “excess” reserve 
holdings also existed in Chile, India, Poland, China, Czech Republic and Venezuela 
and to a lesser extent in Hungary. This raises a further important question. To what 
extent should countries avoid holding reserves above adequate levels? What is the 
opportunity cost of holding reserves? As discussed earlier these costs are difficult to 
calculate with any degree of precision. Put simply, holding reserves means that they 
are not spent. The opportunity cost of stockpiling reserves is therefore the difference 
between the return on reserves and the return on the resources upon which reserves 
could have been spent. The former Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of 
Australia, Stephen Grenville (1999) has observed of the Guidotti-Greenspan rule, 
“why..(is)..this short-term debt..useful in the first place, if the proceeds of the short-
                                                                                                                                            
   18
term borrowing have to be stacked away in reserves (at a lower rate of return than the 
cost of borrowing)” (p.6)?
14  
In what follows we make an attempt to estimate the potential opportunity cost 
of reserve accumulation so that this may be juxtaposed against the benefits
15. 
Following Rodrik (2000), we make two key assumptions. First, all reserves beyond 
the age-old rule of thumb of three months’ worth of imports are considered to be 
“excess”. We treat these “excess” levels of reserves as the opportunity cost of 
maintaining an open capital account. Second, the spread between the yield on foreign 
reserves (the US Treasury bill rate) is used as a proxy of the marginal cost of domestic 
funds and is taken to be 6 percentage points
16. Under these assumptions, and as 
reported in Table 3, we find the annual cost of this “insurance policy premium” 
against financial market unpredictability to be of the order of 0.3 to 1 percent of GDP 
for the five crisis-affected economies in East Asia in 1999. As a share of GDP, these 
costs are the highest for Thailand and Malaysia and least for the Philippines.  
c  Tiers of Liquidity 
Since our computations imply that there may be a significant cost associated 
with holding reserves, another question directly follows on. Is there any way in which 
                                                 
14 Similarly the Economist (September 23-29, 2000) has noted of this external balance sheet 
rule: 
It is rather as though a household with lots of cash sitting idle in a low-
interest bank account was at the same time paying a much higher interest rate 
on its debt. It would make more sense to repay some of that debt (p.90).   
 
15 This draws on Bird, Rajan and Siregar (2002). While the discussion thus far has focused on 
the Baumol transactions theory (see fn 7), there is an older strand of the literature a la Tobin-
Markowitz which focuses on optimising the returns on the reserve holdings subject to the risk 
associated with the assets of the central bank (“portfolio theory of the demand for 
international reserves”). 
 
16 Ideally we would like to have obtained data on an individual country’s market bond rates 
and estimated more exact spreads. Rodrik (2000) argues that for a lot of emerging and 
developing countries this 6 percent spread is likely to be a conservative estimate of the true 
opportunity cost of holding reserves.   19
the liquidity yield from holding reserves may be generated without the need for 
individual countries to continue to accumulate them? One way might be for regional 
economies to develop a network of swap arrangements that would provide member 
countries with extra liquidity in the event of a crisis. This is in fact the direction in 
which East Asia appears to be moving (Bird and Rajan, 2002 and Rajan, 2002b).  
The implications of the analysis in this section are at least two fold. First, it 
may certainly be sensible for countries with inadequate reserves to build them up to 
“adequate levels”. This will tend to reduce their vulnerability to speculative attack by 
creating more confidence in the minds of investors, and may provide a brief time 
period within which policy may be altered before a crisis becomes full-blown. But 
second, beyond adequate levels, it may be preferable to develop alternative ways of 
providing short-term liquidity which do not require further reserve accumulation. 
Countries would then have two lines of defence. Owned reserves are always likely to 
offer the highest degree of liquidity and have zero conditionally, but these features 
alone do not mean that it is always desirable to add to the stock of them. Indeed, both 
from a systemic and individual country perspective, it may be desirable to have “tiers 
of liquidity”. The top tier would be owned reserves. The second tier would be regional 
liquidity arrangements and the third tier would be conventional IMF lending (Bird and 
Rajan, 2002). With such a structure, the degree of liquidity could be inversely related 
to the degree of conditionality. 
The revealed preference of some countries to accumulate reserves beyond 
levels that would be deemed adequate by the rules of thumb ratios discussed in this 
section clearly does not necessarily imply irrational behaviour. Rather, it may simply 
mean that governments have assessed the benefits and costs of acquiring and holding 
reserves in a different way. Assuming that they are behaving rationally, continued   20
reserve accumulation implies that, at the margin, the benefits of extra reserves are 
perceived as exceeding the costs. It seems likely that there is a political premium on 
avoiding future crises and retaining the option of a slower speed of adjustment should 
the balance of payments weaken. However, the danger may be that reserve 
accumulation is seen as a substitute for appropriate policy reform, not least in terms of 
exchange rate policy
17. And this could ultimately enhance the risk of further economic 
difficulties. Again policy with respect to international reserves needs to be seen as but 
one part of a coherent overall economic strategy. Thus Fischer (2001) has recently 
noted of the IMF’s surveillance policies: 
(W)e are focusing more on those policy areas that can leave a country 
vulnerable to crises. The management of reserves is one. Others 
include macroeconomic policies, exchange rate regimes, financial 
sector soundness, and debt management (p.2). 
 
4. CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
Reserve inadequacy was perceived as a major deficiency of the international 
monetary system in the 1960s and reform proposals focussed on increasing the global 
quantity of international reserves. In retrospect, the apparent inadequacy of reserves 
was as much a reflection of an inadequate adjustment mechanism. Exchange rates 
were pegged under the Bretton Woods system and demand management policies 
failed to eliminate balance of payments disequilibria. Although its theoretical 
foundations were always weak, the adequacy of individual countries’ reserves was 
frequently judged by consulting the reserves-to-imports ratio. While this measure may 
still remain indicative for countries that are vulnerable to current account shocks, its 
shortcomings have been underlined since the early 1990s when balance of payments 
                                                 
17 Indeed, another reason for the accumulation of reserves is the “fear of floating” that seems 
to characterise developing countries (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000, Hausmann, et al., 2000 and 
Rajan, 2002a).    21
crises have had more to do with volatile international capital flows than unstable 
export earnings. Reserves-to-imports ratios often failed to identify crisis countries ex 
ante, while crises themselves have been characterised by rapid reserve depletion. 
Dissatisfaction with the old measures of reserve adequacy has stimulated the 
pursuit of superior ones. Unfortunately it remains impossible to convert sound theory 
into operational indicators since many of the theoretical determinants of reserve 
adequacy are difficult (impossible) to measure. Whilst rules-of-thumb may therefore 
be unavoidable, proposals have been made to augment the reserves-to-imports ratio 
with other ratios that reflect a country’s vulnerability to reduced capital inflows or 
capital outflows.  
The evidence presented in this paper supports the claim that these capital 
account related measures would have been helpful in identifying reserves that were 
inadequate in the event of a loss of market confidence; although it is also suggested 
that dynamic measures of changes in reserve levels would be helpful in signalling the 
need for changes in economic policy. Before the event, therefore, countries may need 
to hold reserves slightly in excess of their short-term external debt in order to provide 
a window of opportunity for policy change in advance of reserves imploding in the 
context of a full-blown crisis.  
With memories of crisis still reasonably fresh, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
crisis countries have exhibited a desire to build up reserves as an insurance against 
future crises. Data drawn from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook show that 
developing countries as a group increased their R/M ratio from 38.5 in 1993 to 52.1 in 
1999 (Table 4). However, taken too far this may represent inappropriate diagnosis and 
prescription. Where fundamental policy change is needed, even high levels of 
reserves may prove inadequate. Beyond some minimum or threshold reserve ratio   22
designed to avoid a sudden loss of confidence, the costs of further reserve acquisition 
may well exceed the benefits. Building up reserves by short-term borrowing will 
involve a cost in terms of the interest rate differential between the return on reserves 
and the rate of interest on borrowing. While improving the reserves-to-imports ratio, 
reserve accumulation financed by borrowing will fail to strengthen the reserves-to-
short-term external debt ratio since both the numerator and denominator increase and 
it is also open to the Grenville-critique noted above. Accumulating reserves by 
running current account surpluses will avoid this problem but carries an opportunity 
cost both in terms of sacrificed imports as well as holding relatively low-yielding 
foreign assets. There may be better ways of increasing the availability of short-term 
liquidity via pooling arrangements, especially where speculative attacks on currencies 
follow a sequential rather than a concurrent path, as they appear to do.  
In relation to this, while it may be sensible in the midst of a crisis for the IMF 
to recommend that countries should replenish depleted reserves, it may be unwise to 
take this too far and advocate the sustained accumulation of reserves. For the 
practicability of agreeing IMF-backed programmes, better rule-of-thumb measures of 
reserve adequacy are certainly needed than the conventional reserves-to-imports ratio. 
However, sustained reserve accumulation via running current account surpluses 
merely makes certain now the uncertain future consumption sacrifices that reserves 
are intended to avoid.  There is little point in having a lending institution such as the 
IMF if countries attempt to accumulate reserves to a level at which they would almost 
never need the liquidity that the IMF can provide. While recent crises have 
appropriately drawn attention to the issue of reserve adequacy and the problems of 
measuring it, they should not be interpreted as implying that emerging economies   23
need to pursue policies that result in a sustained increase in their owned reserves; 
other preferable liquidity enhancing policies are available.   24
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Table 1: Reserve Adequacy Indicators: Emerging Market Countries 
(All data is for end-1999) 
 
Independent Float Reserves/Imports 
(Weeks of imports) 
Reserves/Short-term External Debt 
(percentage) 
Brazil 35  83 
Chile 50  200 
Colombia 40  134 
India 38  327 
Indonesia 57  126 
Korea 32  162 
Mexico 11  119 
Peru 56  131 
Philippines 22 145 
Poland 28  316 
Russian Federation  11  70 
South Africa  12  43 
Thailand 43  206 
(average) 33  159 
    
Managed Float or Fixed 
Regime 
  
China 49  655 
Czech Republic  23  225 
Hungary 20  154 
Malaysia 24  336 
Turkey 30  93 
Venezuela 43  235 
(average) 32  283 
    
Currency Boards    
Argentina 53  62 
Hong Kong SAR  28  103 
(average) 41  82 
 
 
Source: De Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001). All data is from the IMF’s International Financial 
Statistics (line 1.1.d. for non-gold reserves, line 71.d for imports c.i.f. and the sum of line 34 and 35 for 
broad money,) except for the short-term external debt data (residual maturity) which is from the Joint 
BIS/IMF/OEDC/World Bank Statistics on External Debt (line G, H and I). The debt data, which is 
collected from creditor sources, may deviate from the data reported in individual IMF staff reports, 
which is usually obtained from the national authorities. The exchange rate classification is based on the 
IMFs Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (2000). We have 
classified anything other than an independent float or a currency board as a managed float or fixed 
regime.    31
 
 
Table 2: Estimated Adequate and Actual Reserves 
(end 1999, billions of US dollars) 
 
Independent Float BHK  measure
a Augmented  STED 
Measure 
b 
Actual reserves  
Brazil 47.4-53.0  43.2  34.8 
Chile 7.7-8.2  7.4  14.4 
Colombia 6.3-6.8  5.9  7.6 
India 14.9-19.8  10.3  32.7 
Indonesia 24.2-27.4  21.6  26.4 
Korea 51.0-56.2  47.1  74.0 
Mexico 29.9-33.1  27.5  31.8 
Peru 7.1-7.5  6.8  8.7 
Philippines 10.0-11.0  9.4  13.2 
Poland 8.9-10.0  8.0  24.5 
Russian Federation  13.5-15.0  12.5  8.5 
South Africa  16.6-18.6  15.3  6.4 
Thailand 19.2-21.9  17.1  34.1 
      
Managed Float or Fixed       
China 86.9-149.8  24.8  157.7 
Czech Republic  6.9-8.2  5.9  12.8 
Hungary 8.0-8.9  7.3  11.0 
Malaysia 12.1-15.1  9.4  30.6 
Turkey 29.1-33.3  25.9  23.3 
Venezuela 6.2-7.2  5.4  12.3 
      
Currency Boards      
Argentina 45.0-47.5  43.7  26.3 
Hong Kong SAR  99.7-105.5  96.1  96.2 
 
 
Notes:  a) This measure is provided by De Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001) where they 
  amalgamate the R/STED ratio with a reserves-to-broad money ratio adjusted to reflect the-
  fraction presented as a range of M2 which may realistically be expected to be mobilised 
  against reserves in a short time span.  They also make an allowance for the fact that “not all 
  emerging market economies are equally susceptible to the risk of capital flight”. To make 
  the adjustment they use The Economist’s country risk index which takes into account 77 
  different indicators ranging from monetary and fiscal policy to political stability. The fraction 
  of broad money multiplied by the country risk index is then added to the amount of STED. 
b) This measure simply augments STED in the way described in the text of the paper by 
adding a “policy change” cushion of 3 per cent of short-term external debt.  
Source:  Modified from Table 3 in De Beaufort Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001). All data is from 
  International Financial Statistics for reserves and from BIS/IMF/OEDC/World Bank 
 Statistics  for external debt. The exchange rate classification is based on the IMF’s Annual 
  Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (2000). Reserves have been 
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Table 3 





















Annual Cost of 








30588.2 4.8  15  0.90 
Philippines 
 
13299.7 4.3  5  0.30 
Thailand 
 




73987.3 5.9  9  0.54 
 
Notes:  a) Total reserves minus gold at the end of 1999 
b) “Excess” refers to the level beyond the 3-month benchmark 
c) Assuming a 6 percent spread between the yield on foreign reserves and the marginal cost of 
borrowing 
Source:  Computed from International Financial Statistics, IMF T
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